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Abstract 
False consciousness requires a general explanation for why, and how, oppressed individuals 
believe propositions against, as opposed to aligned with, their own well-being in virtue of  their 
oppressed status. This involves four explanatory desiderata: belief  acquisition, content 
prevalence, limitation, and systematicity. A social constructionist approach satisfies these by 
understanding the concept of  false consciousness as regulating social research rather than as 
determining the exact mechanisms for all instances: the concept attunes us to a complex of  
mechanisms conducing oppressed individuals to mistake social understandings of  themselves 
as natural self-understandings—the limits lie where these overlap, or are entirely absent.  
Women pundits like Ann Coulter and Janet Bloomfield consistently argue that women’s suffrage was a 
mistake and that women today should be disenfranchised. They claim that women “have had the vote in 
the West for almost 100 years, and all they have done is vote to destroy and destabilize the world men 
built for us” (Bloomfield 2017). Their arguments echo those of  women antisuffragists in Victorian 
Britain, who campaigned against suffrage on the basis that “the necessary and normal experience of  
women […] do not and can never provide them with such materials for sound [political] judgment as are 
open to men.” (“An Appeal” 1889, p. 782). Such cases are baffling at first glance, for they involve agents 
systematically regarding themselves as prudentially or morally justified in acting in ways that contribute 
to their own oppression. 
In response, social philosophers often invoke the traditionally Marxist notion of  false consciousness in their 
particular analyses of  such phenomena. ‘Falseness’ here is understood as threefold: epistemically, 
functionally, and genetically (Geuss 1981, Shelby 2003). That is, false consciousness is a set of  ignorant beliefs, 
functioning to motivate actions that would perpetuate structural oppression, and caused by epistemic practices 
adversely conditioned by structural oppression. While this may also include a belief  that p, where p is true, this is 
still understood as ignorant here insofar as it falls short of  knowledge: the belief  would still be held if  p 
were false and it is based on unreliable belief-forming processes.  1
However, the concept of  false consciousness is often denigrated as suffering from several problems. The 
first is explanatory: the concept is seen as lacking an adequate general theory and bottoming out as an ad 
hoc explanation for particular behaviour. The second is normative: the concept is seen as imposing 
evaluative standards that are foreign to the agents being criticised. The third is epistemological: where the 
relevant evaluative standards are epistemically inaccessible to even the critic. And the fourth is agential: 
the use of  the concept is seen as implicitly supporting, if  not amounting to, victim-blaming. These 
problems must be addressed if  the concept of  false consciousness is to perform the diagnostic work 
that social philosophers want for it to do in their analyses of  structural oppression (cf. Celikates 2017). 
In this paper, I focus on the first and most fundamental of  these: the explanatory problem. 
The explanatory problem of  false consciousness is the lack of  a satisfactory standard explanation for 
how individual cognition and social schemas generally interact in (sometimes overlapping) oppressive 
practices, such that agents systematically believe propositions against their own well-being. First, past 
attempts to address this problem by the Analytical Marxists (G. A. Cohen, Jon Elster) have been found 
 In other words, such beliefs are both epistemically insensitive and unsafe.1
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to be either ontologically excessive, positing a self-maintaining entity over and above individuals, or 
excessively individualistic, being too focused on individual psychology to reveal anything informative 
about structural oppression (Rosen 1996). As such, the concept is generally deemed to be theoretically 
ill-suited for systematic research and emancipatory praxis beyond particular, one-off  cases. Second, more 
recent attempts tended to only focus on static, seemingly self-contained, singular types of  oppressive 
schemas. But a general theory has to account for how dynamic and overlapping types of  oppression 
affect agents at their junctions differently (cf. Curry 2014, Ásta 2019). It is crucial to recognise both the 
theoretical inseparability of  identity categories (for example, ‘Black woman’) and the various injustices 
that are occasioned by one-sided analyses. False consciousnesses may conflict in cases where structures 
of  oppression overlap differently. Overlooking such conflicts means overlooking the specific epistemic 
and moral harms suffered by such agents. 
To address these concerns, I propose a social constructionist approach here to the explanatory problem as an 
exercise in critical social ontology (cf. Renault 2016). The approach brings together social construction 
and critical theory to better satisfy the theoretical and emancipatory requirements of  social analyses 
hitherto overlooked in previous approaches—especially in cases of  overlapping oppression. Following 
recent directions taken by social constructionists like Sally Haslanger, I draw on Louis Althusser’s 
discussion of  ideology in On the Reproduction of  Capitalism to understand the concept of  false 
consciousness as allowing us to attend to the various stabilising mechanisms in structural oppression that 
conduce the oppressed to mistake socially constructed understandings of  themselves as natural self-
understandings.  2
In what follows, I first consider the relation between ideology and false consciousness, motivating the 
need for a theory of  false consciousness independent of  the theory of  ideology (§1). I then lay out the 
explanatory desiderata that any such theory is required to satisfy for social critique (§2). I evaluate three 
theoretical approaches against how they satisfy these desiderata—approaches taken as providing 
explanations for false consciousness in analytic social philosophy (§3): functionalism, which explains it in 
terms of  its overall societal function; psychologism, which explains it in terms of  oppressed individuals’ 
psychological failures; and processualism, which explains it in terms of  the oppressed’s epistemic deference 
to oppressors. While these are shown to be inadequate for satisfying the desiderata on their own as 
opposed to the social constructionist approach, I ultimately suggest that they can all be subsumed under 
the latter (§4). In doing so, I return constantly to the case of  women antisuffragists—particularly Mary 
Augusta Ward, the founding president of  the Women’s National Antisuffrage League—as a relatively 
uncontroversial instance of  false consciousness. However, I also draw from a wide range of  oppressive 
contexts, since what we require is a general theory instead one specific to women antisuffragists. 
It should be underscored that social constructionism is not meant to be a new approach as particular 
accounts of  false consciousness go: historical precedences include Hume’s Natural History of  Religion, 
José Rizal’s The Indolence of  the Filipino, and Beauvoir’s The Second Sex. What is advanced here, rather, is a 
general approach to theorising about false consciousness that meets the explanatory desiderata needed by 
the social philosopher, whichever type(s) of  oppression analysed.  Resolving the explanatory problem 3
would thus be a fundamental step for rehabilitating the concept of  false consciousness as a whole, on 
the basis of  which the normative, epistemological and agential problems may be addressed elsewhere. 
1. Ideology and False Consciousness 
 Haslanger would herself be hesitant to use the language of ‘false consciousness’ out of an unwarranted (as will be 2
shown) fear of the methodologically individualist cognitivism it connotes (Haslanger 2017a, p. 9 note 8).
 In Althusser’s words, what we are concerned with is “the project of a theory of ideology in general, as opposed to a 3
theory of particular ideologies, considered either with respect to their regional contents (religious, moral, legal, or political 
ideology, and so on) or class orientation (bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, proletarian ideology, and so on)” (Althusser 2014, 
174).
 of 2 19
[PREPRINT]
[PREPRINT]
As a critical concept, false consciousness is not only meant to draw attention to neglected oppressive 
aspects of  an otherwise seemingly benign social structure. In doing so, it is also meant to orient us 
towards amelioration or emancipation. This is because, as foregrounded in the Marxian traditions and 
related critical theories, the concept is bound up with the concept of  ideology—so much so that the terms 
‘false consciousness’ and ‘ideological consciousness’ are often used interchangeably in the case of  the 
oppressed.  Such theorists generally take ‘ideology’ to refer to a schema of  “public meanings, scripts, 4
etc.” that serves in some way to undergird, and also arises out of, problematic social practices (Haslanger 
2019, p. 5).  Generally, agents, oppressed or otherwise, are under schemas that confer upon them a range 5
of  constraints and enablements salient for action-guidance. Given this, we can say that a social structure 
consists in a network of  practices involving resources (such as tools and materials) and agents, organised 
by schemas (Haslanger 2011). These schemas are usually taken for granted, left in the background and 
unthematised, such that they seem to be ‘just the way things are’. Allowing us to thematise, problematise, 
and reorient, our consideration of  social practices is precisely what the concept of  ideology is meant to 
do: that we would be able to identify problems in schemas that manifest in particular social practices. For 
instance, British suffragists drew on some tacit theory of  ideology when they campaigned against the 
gender inequality manifest in asymmetrical marital laws and parliamentary exclusion. Such practices, they 
argued, were for a long time organised around the principle that “it is the duty of  women, […] that it is 
their nature, to live for others; to make complete abnegation of  themselves, and to have no life but in 
their affections […] to the men with whom they are connected, or to the children who constitute an 
additional and indefeasible tie between them and a man” (Mill 1995, p. 132–133). 
There are, of  course, recidivistic beliefs that arise out of  delusions, self-deception, epistemic vice, or 
implicit bias. But false consciousness cannot be understood as delusions, insofar as the latter involve 
beliefs of  ordinarily irrational agents; as self-deception, insofar as this does not capture the systematicity 
of  beliefs that contribute to structural oppression; as epistemic vice, insofar as such beliefs are not 
required to be formed in virtue of  an agent’s position in structures of  oppression; and as implicit bias, 
insofar as this involves attitudes that are directly inaccessible to consciousness. Admittedly, however, 
there is a trend that defines ‘false consciousness’ independently of  ideology: as merely ignorance about 
the reasons for which an agent holds onto a given set of  beliefs, sometimes aligning it with a Sartrean 
notion of  bad faith (Barnes 1997, Shelby 2014). Taking their cue from Engels’ Letter to Mehring, some 
philosophers decouple the concept from the concept of  ideology and its structural implications, holding 
that the former is a cognitive matter of  misunderstanding the motives of  one’s beliefs. Such beliefs are 
thought to be held rationally when they are really held irrationally. Exegetical issues aside, this is 
unhelpfully vague. Such a characterisation could apply to a wide range of  beliefs that we would not 
ordinarily regard as problematic, even if  they were held recidivistically. For example, “that I have hands, 
that 2 + 2 = 4, that my mother loves me” (Srinivasan 2016, p. 374). As such, it would be more than 
prudent to take ‘false consciousness’ to refer to a recidivistic set of  ignorant beliefs held by oppressed 
agents under ideology.  6
Despite their conceptual intimacy, it is crucial to distinguish between questions concerning ideology and 
those concerning false consciousness. A focus on ideology is more concerned with problematic 
representations in relation to structures as a whole. But a focus on false consciousness is more 
concerned with the formation and maintenance of  these problematic representations in relation to the 
 The ideological consciousness of oppressors, although also of considerable importance and would no doubt relate to the 4
greater amount of recent discussion on systematic ignorance of oppressors, will not be considered here.
 Recent reflections on the concept of ideology disambiguate between two senses of the term as employed historically: 5
general or pejorative (Haslanger 2014, Celikates 2017). The general (or non-evaluative) sense remains agnostic about the 
problematic nature of the social practices undergirded by ideology; whereas the pejorative (or evaluative) sense has that 
the social practices are problematic. The latter sense is used here, leaving aside concerns about how ‘problematic’ is to be 
determined (i.e. the normative and epistemological problems).
 There are, of course, non-doxastic forms of false consciousness: perceptual, emotional, etc. (Rosen 1996). While some 6
or all these may no doubt overlap in various cases, I focus here only on doxastic false consciousness, given that most 
users of the concepts of false consciousness and ideology largely understand them to minimally involve beliefs (see 
Meyerson 1991, Jaeggi 2009, Stanley 2015).
 of 3 19
[PREPRINT]
[PREPRINT]
lived experiences of  agents in these structures. Such explicit focus on how and why oppressed agents at 
these structural nodes “effectively confer from the bottom up the relations of  subordination that affect 
their lives” is relatively lacking (Thompson 2013, p. 185). But this focus is essential for critique. The 
concept of  false consciousness attends to that which a focus on ideology alone overlooks: one’s capacity 
for self-knowledge qua agent. Agents, after all, may be located at junctions of  overlapping structures of  
oppression, thereby developing belief-sets involving multiple ideologies (Crenshaw 1991, Hutchinson 
2001). 
A ‘bottom up’ approach, on the one hand, better attends to how overlapping structures of  oppression 
and ideologies present distinct—not just additive—instances of  false consciousness that can also be 
dynamic and interactive. A theory of  ideology alone is ill-suited for this task. To illustrate this, consider 
how the women antisuffragists’ widely circulated justifications for rejecting the vote reflected their varied 
social positions, where gender oppression overlapped with economic oppression.  Both Ward, who was 7
a then millionaire-equivalent, and Maud Ellen Simkins, a wage-labourer, shared the ignorant belief  that 
“women are domestic creatures” by nature and can never be political ones (Simkins 1909a, p. 14). Yet, 
for Ward, ‘domestic’ activities included “care of  the sick and the insane; the treatment of  the poor; the 
education of  children”, confined by national borders (“An Appeal” 1889, p. 782). While, for Simkins, 
‘domesticity’ was restricted to the upkeep of  the household. Ward campaigned against suffrage for 
reasons such as the superfluity of  the vote partly since “all the principal injustices of  the law towards 
women have been amended by means of  the existing constitutional machinery” (“An Appeal” 1889, p. 
787). Conversely, Simkins publicly opposed suffrage because it would disproportionally affect women 
workers like herself, who would be saddled with “the triple burden of  wage-earning, housekeeping, and 
political responsibility”, believing that the initial double burden of  wage-earning and housekeeping was 
“because the wealthier women have been neglecting the first elementary duties of  women that the poor 
have come to [squalor and discomfort]” (Simkins 1909b, p. 790–793). Both Ward and Simkins’ false 
consciousnesses did not result from just adding patriarchal and bourgeois ideologies together—there is 
mutual reinforcement between these ideologies in each specific junction, presenting unique types of  
oppression and corollary false consciousnesses depending on the overlap. Our understanding of  how 
patriarchal ideology worked in Britain thus cannot just involve a ‘top down’ accommodation of  these 
diverging sets of  beliefs. While both sets of  beliefs might follow from the principle of  feminine self-
abnegation, this alone is insufficient to account for the conflict between them. 
On the other hand, the need for ‘bottom up’ analyses also comes from a growing trend that approaches 
emancipation in terms of  the possibility of  collectivising epistemic resistance among the oppressed and 
their own responsibility to resist and challenge structural oppression (Goodin and Spiekermann 2015). 
This is because, as standpoint theorists and epistemologists of  resistance are keen to emphasise, “any 
account seeking to remedy structural injustice in ignorance of  the standpoint of  the oppressed would be 
both paternalistic and more likely to err”, even reinforcing the oppressive relations (Jugov and Ypi 2019, 
p. 11). If  the goal of  critique is to conduce the emancipation of  the oppressed, for them to overcome 
their alienation in the social world and in relation to themselves, it must not only attend to the problems 
of  ideology but also attend to how exactly individual epistemic agencies might be restored.  The concern 8
here is thus not just the content of  a given ideology and how it manifests in social practices, but also the 
processes rendering an agent’s lived ideological experience ‘natural’ and how they might be avoided or overcome. 
2. Explanatory Desiderata 
In setting out a general theory of  false consciousness, we must first clarify the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for any explanation of  any instance of  the phenomenon. I will now lay out the explanatory 
desiderata that such a theory must satisfy, along with why and how it should do this. An adequate 
explanation for any instance of  false consciousness must satisfy the following: 
 Also, colonial oppression: much of the discourse also concerned “Imperial responsibilities” (Ward 1918, p. 58).7
 For more on the notion of ideology critique, see Shelby 2003, Jaeggi 2009.8
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Acquisition: How affected oppressed agents come to form and maintain certain ignorant beliefs as 
(putative) knowledge. 
Content: How the content of  such beliefs are formed and maintained in the structural ambits 
within which such agents are embedded; 
Scope: How other oppressed agents may nevertheless avoid, or even resist, forming or 
maintaining such beliefs. 
Any explanation of  false consciousness must not only attend to the processes resulting in the acquisition 
of  ignorant beliefs at the individual level in a way that resists counter-evidence (Acquisition) but also 
processes that promote ignorant content at the structural level (Content). And given the ameliorative aim 
of  critique, resistant epistemologies among oppressed groups, and how infrequently we notice false 
consciousness among the oppressed, such an explanation must also involve accounting for how an 
absence of  false consciousness is nevertheless possible despite these processes (Scope). 
Moreover, there is a ‘meta-requirement’ for any explanation for false consciousness: 
Systematicity: An account of  false consciousness must explain the previous three desiderata as a 
systematic unity. 
In a systematic unity, components are interconnected in a manner grounded by a single principle to form 
a whole. Within the context of  social critique, the limited acquisition and content of  false consciousness 
should be identifiable as belonging to a social structure (or overlapping structures).  This would mean 9
being able to map out mutually implicating beliefs within a particular oppressive schema (or schemas), 
allowing us to characterise them as ideological and needing amelioration. For example, an explanation of  
a belief-set involving ‘women are naturally deficient in political deliberation’ or ‘women should be 
married’ would be interconnected within the patriarchal schema of  Victorian Britain’s social structure, 
grounded by the aforementioned principle of  feminine self-abnegation. Whereas a belief  like ‘women 
inhabit the second planet from the Sun’ might be connected with the previous beliefs by the principle ‘x 
pertains to women’, but it is neither mutually implicating nor relevant for social critique. 
There cannot be any social critique with explanatory patchworks that satisfy all three conditions but have 
them obtaining together only by sheer happenstance. That is, it is not enough to just say that Acquisition 
and Content often coincidentally operate together and that Scope can be explained insofar as such 
operations are absent. To illustrate this, consider the particular case of  Ward’s false consciousness:  10
ANTISUFFRAGIST: Mary Ward has the ignorant beliefs that women are naturally deficient at 
political deliberation and that suffrage is unnecessary for addressing injustices specific to women 
[epistemic ‘falsity’]. These beliefs motivate her to pen and publish the influential manifesto, “An 
Appeal Against Female Suffrage” [functional ‘falsity’]. Ward has these beliefs owing to a general 
absence of  women in Victorian politics and also her being unfamiliar with how legislative 
practices more than education still constrained working-class women thus far [genetic ‘falsity’]. 
A possible (fictional) patchwork explanation for this, satisfying all the explanatory desiderata but 
Systematicity, might be: 
 cf. Hannah Arendt’s understanding of ideology as “quite literally what its name indicates: it is the ‘logic of an idea’” 9
(Arendt 1976, 469).
 The choice to focus on Ward’s case over Simkins’ is also due to the former’s beliefs being better documented over time10
—whether through her political publications, novels, memoir, or personal correspondences—throughout the antisuffrage 
campaigns.
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EXPLANATIONPA: Ward has these beliefs because, as a child, she picked up a note in school 
stating that ‘women are naturally deficient in political deliberation’ and that ‘suffrage is 
unnecessary for addressing injustices specific to women’. She had no opinion on the matter 
before this encounter because these were not in the school’s curriculum; she maintains them 
because her childhood memories of  school becomes sacrosanct for her in face of  rapid 
urbanisation [Acquisition]. The note was in the school because someone scribbled it in a sudden 
religious epiphany and it is maintained because everyone who picked up the note just tosses it on 
the ground again [Content]. And those who did not attend the school did not pick up the note, 
thereby not forming and subsequently maintaining the beliefs [Scope]. 
It is clear from this that, even if  EXPLANATIONPA were true, it would fall short of  the social 
philosopher’s aim of  bringing one’s attention to the processes that systematically operated among similar 
antisuffragists: the explanation, while it might be satisfactory for explaining ANTISUFFRAGIST in the 
context of  such a biography, is irrelevant to structural oppression, as the details attended to do not 
highlight structural factors that contribute to the epistemic, functional, and genetic ‘falsity’ of  her beliefs. 
For example, the reason for her school’s curriculum design, the reason for epiphany’s antisuffragist 
content, or the reason why suffragists were not generally in her school. EXPLANATIONPA could also 
apply to someone like Simkins in a way that provides no insight into how Ward’s bourgeois position is 
related to her position under patriarchy. It also does not account for how her beliefs and actions 
converged with the other bourgeois antisuffragists. Over 420,000 mainly upper- and middle-class women 
signed an antisuffrage parliamentary petition organised by the Women’s National Antisuffrage League. 
And modern historians gather that most working-class women then “had little interest in the vote before 
the war, and only limited interest once it had been finally placed in [their hands]” (Bush 2007, p. 189, 
311). How Acquisition and Content are related in the cases of  these two classes of  women antisuffragists, 
and how their cases are related to each other, thus cannot be a matter of  mere statistical coincidence. 
Such operations were not just regular but schematic: affected agents regularly accept or reject evidence 
according to these schemas governing false consciousnesses. For a theory of  false consciousness to 
contribute to the diagnostic and ameliorative tasks of  critique, it must therefore show how these sets of  
beliefs are interconnected within ideologies with structures of  oppression. 
Furthermore, for an explanation to be critical, it is expected to also involve Scope systematically for at least 
two reasons. First, social philosophers often hold that motivating and normative reasons for ideological 
resistance are already implicit in, and particular to, a given instance of  ideology (Jaeggi 2019). The 
content of  these reasons are to arise from analyses of  the corresponding social structure, instead of  it 
being just a matter of  applying universal epistemological or moral criteria in evaluating the ideology. 
Second, irrespective of  this, if  we hold that emancipatory hope is to be found largely in solidarity among 
the oppressed, we need to account for how such cases diverge for the sake of  differential emancipatory 
strategies. This was reflected in the suffragist arguments directed to women, which had varying degrees 
of  efficacy depending on their audience’s class: they emphasised how extending suffrage would 
ameliorate working-class conditions and how many upper- and middle-class women already had one foot 
in politics via organisations like the Primrose League. 
3. Survey of  Extant Approaches 
Functionalism, psychologism, and processualism are seen as candidate approaches to answering the explanatory 
problem. Criticisms of  functionalist and psychologistic approaches specific to the concept of  ideology 
have had a long run since the heyday of  Analytical Marxism in the 80s (see Rosen 1996). Instead of  
revisiting them, I only focus here on how these approaches, alongside processualism, fail to fully satisfy 
the desiderata for an adequate explanation of  false consciousness. 
3.1. Functionalism 
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Functionalism is an approach to explaining false consciousness, and ideology more broadly, that is often 
associated with the controversial ontological assumption that society is a distinct entity that maintains 
itself  through the false consciousness of  members of  its constituent social groups (Cohen 2001, Shelby 
2003).  Still, the reifying assumption is unnecessary. What is crucial to this approach, as paradigmatically 11
put forward by Cohen, is that false consciousness is functionally explained by the maintenance of  the social 
arrangement of  a society that is stratified across oppressive lines. By ‘functional explanation’, the 
functionalist means that the function of  an attribute of  an object is cited as an explanation of  the object 
having it—akin to the kinds of  explanations that are found in the natural sciences. For example, to 
explain the melanism of  peppered moths, it would be sufficient to cite melanism’s function of  
promoting species survival. This is not because it directly explains the attribute possession but because 
giving the statement ‘A is functional for B’ as an explanation is adequate as a working hypothesis for why a 
particular object is A, without yet needing to provide an underlying, elaborating mechanism (like natural 
selection, in the example). Functionalists thus think it sufficiently explanatory for false consciousness to 
cite its function of  maintaining a given oppressive society. 
The functionalist would explain ANTISUFFRAGIST as follows:  
EXPLANATIONFN: Ward has the ignorant beliefs that women are naturally deficient at political 
deliberation and that suffrage is unnecessary for addressing injustices specific to women, 
motivating her to campaign against women’s suffrage, because this is functional for the patriarchal and 
bourgeois organisation of  Victorian Britain. 
EXPLANATIONFN seems to be able to secure Content: the oppressive content of  ideas (that ‘women are 
naturally deficient at political deliberation’) would be explained as those content that conduce the 
maintenance of  an oppressive society (keeping women out of  politics). It also secures Systematicity: the 
relation of  Content to the social structure is purportedly secured by the principle of  societal self-
maintenance.  
There is, however, no concern for Acquisition and Scope: no account is provided for the mechanisms that 
lead Ward to acquire the relevant ignorant beliefs given her position in gender and economic oppression, 
nor is there any account of  why there should be oppressed agents, like working-class suffragists, who 
systematically avoid false consciousness. Further, the explanations for Content and Systematicity can only be 
partial, since EXPLANATIONFN does not account for why there should be a difference between the 
content of  Ward and Simkins’ belief-sets. In considering the overlap of  gender and economic 
oppression, both their false consciousnesses are simply ‘functional for the patriarchal and bourgeois 
organisation of  Victorian Britain’. 
It is unclear then, how much EXPLANATIONFN is an explanation for false consciousness so much as a 
restatement of  the explanatory problem, like citing the virtus dormitiva of  opium as an explanation for it 
causing sleep. That is, that false consciousness occurs because it sustains a given oppressive society is 
uninformative for the general project set out here: it is in fact just rehashing the functional ‘falsity’ in the 
definition of  the concept as an explanation. This is because a functional explanation is, after all, meant as 
a hypothetical explanation that would guide particular social research into underlying mechanisms (Cohen 
1982, Paprzycka 1998). At the level of  abstraction we require, it is ill-suited for satisfying the explanatory 
desiderata. 
3.2. Psychologism 
‘Psychologism’ refers to various approaches that attempt to explain false consciousness by psychological 
mechanisms at the individual level, coming out of  trends in social psychology to treat structural failures 
 The approach mainly arose out of attempts by Analytical Marxists—specifically, Cohen—to not only provide a scientific 11
basis for the theory of ideology but also maintain as much fidelity to Marx’s works as possible.
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as fundamentally individual failures. These mechanisms that compromise one’s epistemic capacities range 
from adaptive preferences, where ignorant beliefs are indirectly acquired and maintained through an 
adjustment of  the preferability of  an initially preferable object (Elster 1983); the just-world hypothesis, 
where in virtue of  one’s bias that the world is just, oppression is understood as just retribution (Lerner 
1980); to aliefs, which are automatic proto-doxastic responses to stimuli (Gendler 2011). Further, many 
note that the recidivism of  false consciousness occurs not just in virtue of  an agent’s group membership 
in such a structure but also in virtue of  their self-identification as a group member (Meyerson 1991, Cudd 
2006). Roughly, the maintenance of  the relevant ignorant beliefs is motivated by a desire to avoid the 
truth about a given proposition, where this desire is generated by an agent’s higher-order desire to 
understand themselves as a certain kind of  (efficacious and competent) moral agent and where this self-
understanding is in turn derived from their membership in a social group. 
A psychologistic explanation of  ANTISUFFRAGIST would be: 
EXPLANATIONPS: Ward has the ignorant beliefs that women are naturally deficient at political 
deliberation and that suffrage is unnecessary for addressing injustices, motivating her to 
campaign against women’s suffrage, which is formed and maintained owing to psychological mechanisms 
that inhibit her ability to appropriately respond to suffragist reasons. 
The variety of  mechanisms identified by those who adopt this approach ensures that Acquisition would 
be satisfied. However, on its own, EXPLANATIONPS cannot satisfy Content, Scope, and Systematicity. As 
Michael Rosen observes, a focus on content-insensitive failures of  individual psychology is inadequate 
for why the content of  the ignorant beliefs that are accepted and maintained through these mechanisms 
are the kind that support structural oppression (Rosen 1996): the question remains as to why ‘women are 
naturally deficient at political deliberation’ should be the content of  Ward’s belief  in psychological 
failure, instead of  ‘women have equal capacity for political deliberation’. Further, why these failures do or 
do not occur (and continually so) in a systematic way remains unaddressed. Unsurprisingly, explicit 
attempts to explain false consciousness with psychologism do so by hybridising the approach with 
functionalism (Meyerson 1991), historicism (Elster 1982), or processualism (Shelby 2003). 
These hybrid approaches are nevertheless inadequate for critique. Psychologism-functionalism and 
-processualism hybrids (as we will see) would still fail to account for Scope and at least Systematicity, since 
no explanation is provided for systematic resistance (like why such mechanisms are not also in operation 
for suffragists). And while a psychologism-historicism hybrid, wherein psychological mechanisms are 
contextualised within historically specific social practices (like the asymmetrical upbringing and 
education of  Victorian women), may well account for Acquisition, Content, and Scope in particular cases of  
false consciousness, it remains too uninformative for our concern here for a general theory—failing 
Systematicity. 
3.3. Processualism 
Processualism is gaining attention recently due to ongoing work on epistemic oppression (pioneered by 
Kristie Dotson), drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s understanding of  the concept of  ideology as cultural 
hegemony (Medina 2013, Mills 2017). The approach attempts to explain false consciousness by 
articulating the epistemological implications of  the hegemonic relations between the oppressing group 
and the oppressed. That is, instead of  understanding individual epistemic failure among the oppressed to 
be fundamentally explanatory as is the case in psychologism, processualism understands epistemic failure 
to be a relational failure. That is, processualism approaches false consciousness as a result of  an active 
exclusion of  the oppressed from participating in the larger epistemic community by the oppressing group 
at various orders (Dotson 2014). As such, the oppressed have deflated credibility with regard to 
themselves and epistemically defer to an inflated oppressing group with respect to the relevant ignorant 
beliefs. 
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According to the most recent and detailed processualist account by Jason Stanley (2015), it is because the 
oppressed are regularly placed in high-stakes situations (due to less material security) that they lose 
knowledge. That is, as a result of  pragmatic encroachment (whether in virtue of  interest-relativity or 
confidence-shaking), self-confidence in oneself  as an epistemic agent decreases. And given the epistemic 
advantage afforded by their material advantage, members of  the oppressing group overextend epistemic 
and practical authority over to claims pertaining to the oppressed. Consequently, the oppressed defer to 
the oppressing group’s claims, which are systematically detrimental because their content derive from 
legitimation myths developed by the oppressing groups. Such myths arise out of  the latter’s desire to 
preserve the material inequality from which they benefit (like through propaganda). 
The processualist would explain ANTISUFFRAGIST as follows: 
EXPLANATIONPR: Ward has the ignorant beliefs that women are naturally deficient at political 
deliberation and that suffrage is unnecessary for addressing injustices, motivating her to 
campaign against women’s suffrage, due to her deference to the epistemic authority of  men, who propagate 
the myth of  the political inaptitude of  women to maintain their position in the gender hierarchy. 
In this way, EXPLANATIONPR aims to satisfy Acquisition with epistemic deference, Content with 
legitimation myths, and Systematicity with how these relational practices presuppose the hegemonic 
organisation of  social groups. 
However, this account is unable to account for Scope in all instances of  false consciousness. Amia 
Srinivasan illustrates this with the case of  a woman whom we would say does retain knowledge that she 
was sexually harassed, despite being in a high-stakes situation like taking legal action against her boss for 
the act and despite the “scepticism or gaslighting she encounters”, such that “she continues to act 
rationally when she pursues her protest” (Srinivasan 2016, p. 378).  Some address of  this might be found 12
in the idea of  practices where oppressed agents direct their “epistemic energy toward and in connection 
with other non-dominantly situated subjects”, attending to affinities and distinctions among them 
(Pohlhaus Jr. 2020, 245). These would accordingly form new relations and alliances independent of  
oppressors and illuminate “how epistemic systems function in the non-ideal world” (Pohlhaus Jr. 2020, 
247; cf. Medina 2013). However, the idea of  such practices does not suffice for how some of  the 
oppressed avoid false consciousness to begin with. 
Yet even if  this could address Scope, under any processualist approach, Content is not always satisfied. A 
conspiratorial account of  the oppressing group is not always plausible. It is often the case that the 
maintenance of  legitimation myths are unintentional (perhaps as a matter of  ideological consciousness in 
the oppressed) or even only tacit in practice (like implicit bias). Especially for myths maintained by the 
same group across long time scales, such deception would require an accurate grasp of  the actual state 
of  affairs, which is not only unnecessary for propagating these myths but also largely unempirical 
(Shelby 2003). Admittedly, it may be the case that legitimation myths are sometimes initially formed by a 
select portion of  the oppressing group intentionally seeking to preserve their material inequality. But the 
crucial point is that it would be implausible to see this in all occasions of  false consciousness. It seems 
more plausible and common that many legitimation myths that supposedly reinforce structural 
oppression are not perniciously created. Examples of  this include the notions of  meritocracy and racial 
colour-blindness. While these notions may have since been used to legitimise certain structures of  
oppression, this does not imply that their formation were similarly motivated: meritocracy has its earliest, 
and most influential, articulations in Plato’s Republic and Confucius’ Analects; and racial colour-blindness 
in the US civil rights movement. 
 The account itself might thus be said to enact an overextension of epistemic and practical authority (stoking fears of 12
paternalism).
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Further, the necessary material basis of  this approach cannot accommodate the persistence of  cases of  
false consciousness when there is material equality between groups. We see this in cases of  ‘Pinkerton 
Syndrome’, where Singaporean Chinese would tend to provide preferential treatment for White people 
(Chew/Young/Tan 2019). And more generally, processualism alone is still insufficient to account for the 
positive internalisation of  the relevant content by some significant portion of  the oppressed, especially 
among those that further produce highly abstract and nuanced constituent elaborations of  the ignorant 
beliefs. Women antisuffragists were at the forefront of  the Victorian literati. It is not clear why they 
should not just be defeatists, sceptics, or ironists about such beliefs. Both these explanatory gaps apply 
to EXPLANATIONPR. Systematicity and Acquisition thus do not fully obtain under processualism either. 
4. Social Constructionism 
The above approaches to false consciousness are, however, not necessarily in direct tension with each 
other. Instead of  displacing them, the social constructionist approach may perhaps be seen as grounding 
a hybridisation of  all three. In this section, I develop such an approach based on Althusser’s analysis of  
ideology that meets all the explanatory desiderata. Althusser’s analysis of  ideology differs from Gramsci’s 
insofar as the focus is on an agent’s consciousness as structured rather than structural hegemony.  13
Specifically, Althusser understands ideology (or schemas, more generally) as a three-part system that 
involves the “interpellation of  individuals as subjects”, “mutual recognition between subjects and Subject and 
among subjects themselves, as well as the recognition of  the subject by himself ”, and “the absolute 
guarantee that everything really is so” for the subject (Althusser 2014, p. 197). That is, ideology hails an 
individual as such-and-such a participant in its structure, within which they are affirmed and affirm 
themselves as such a participant, and this state of  affairs is naturalised. I conclude by considering how 
functionalism, psychologism, and processualism are subsumed and supplemented by social 
constructionism. 
4.1. Interpellation 
The ‘interpellation of  individuals as subjects’ is a constitutive process by which an individual becomes a 
kind of  subject under a representational schema. In other words, social properties are constructed upon 
a base property (aspects of  the individual human being) to create a subject (an interpellated individual). 
Whether under constitutional (Searle 2010), response-dependent (Pettit 1991) or conferralist frameworks 
(Ásta 2018), social construction minimally involves a joint acceptance condition: 
members of  a group individually accept facts F about object O and there is mutual knowledge 
that other members accept F. 
That is, kinds of  objects are socially constructed when the kind of  object comes to possess certain social 
property, where such a property arise out of  a joint acceptance (that a kind of  object O is F) by 
members of  a group of  people whether at the level of  formal institutions or informal communities.  
Crucially for interpellation, groups of  people—that is, members within them—are also constructed as 
subjects, insofar as they have properties jointly accepted of  them within a network of  social practices. 
For example, an intersex individual born with both ovarian and testicular tissues would be assigned 
exclusively either female or male by most medical institutions. These interpellating social categories and 
corollary properties come with, if  not just are, restrictions and enablements within social contexts that 
would have significant effects on the attitudes and behaviours of  individuals. That is, individuals are 
interpellated as subjects insofar as they are always already constructed under some schema that relate 
them in social practices—as schematised objects—to other resources, other schematised agents, and to 
 For consistency, Althusser’s own notion of ‘ideology’ is simply referred to as ‘schema’ here, as he uses the term in a 13
neutral way that also applies to unproblematic practices. For example, he refers to revolutionary organisations as 
operating on “proletarian ideology” (Althusser 2014, p. 181).
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themselves. Such schematisation is a precondition of  being considered a participant in a given social 
practice.  
Importantly, apart from institutional regulation like incarceration or even the threat of  negative 
communal sanctions (which both apply to the already-constituted subject), Althusser notes a “[strange] 
obligation to respond to every hailing [by interpellation]”: an underlying norm for an individual to 
acknowledge themselves as being addressed by the social schemas they find themselves in (Althusser 
2014, p. 191).  This norm of  acknowledging ‘being a subject who is addressed as such-and-such’ asserts 14
a pressure on individuals to participate in joint acceptances whose source is thus neither institutional nor 
communal but simply an individual’s receptivity to sociality—even if  they do not subsequently recognise 
themselves in the schema or only do so in defeatism, scepticism, or irony. Non-binary individuals, for 
example, still acknowledge binary gender schemas as at least addressing them—albeit problematically. 
Therefore, the normative force of  joint acceptances is not found merely coming from the confines of  
the oppressed group (cf. Thompson 2017). Both oppressing and oppressed groups partake in the same, 
wider social structure and ideology, within which they partake in the joint acceptance of  themselves as 
instantiating certain social facts particular to the groups they belong to. 
So while schemas may be found to be functionally problematic in critique, the constructive acts that give 
rise to certain attitudes and self-understandings that support structural oppression need not be—that is, 
both the initial positing of  an object as possessing certain facts and the subsequent joint acceptances. 
Pace conspiratorial accounts, constructive acts may also just be defective or unwitting, with the effect of  
the oppressive relation resulting unintentionally. 
4.2. Recognition 
As a result of  interpellation, a subject is able to have standing under a schema or ideology—be recognised
—with respect to the social world, other subjects, and, most importantly for the concept of  false 
consciousness, oneself. That is, a subject acquires social standing within a network of  practices, within 
which they are related to—reinforcing joint acceptance—as such-and-such a subject, whether practically 
(in sexual harassment) or representationally (in TV scripts). And this forms the basis of  their self-
recognition and hence self-understanding. This is what Ian Hacking (1995) observes as ‘the looping 
effect’, feedback loops between social classifications and how the classified understand themselves and 
behave: 
 
Figure 1: Looping Illustration 1 
That this feedback loop occurs might be said to be simply a feature of  our cognition in general. Seen 
from the predictive processing paradigm, cognition aims to track the world by modelling sensory input 
with generative models, which “capture the statistical structure of  some set of  observed inputs by 
inferring a causal matrix able to give rise to that very structure” (Clark 2015, p. 21). Our cognition not 
only models objects and their relationship to each other but also agents—including, crucially, our selves. 
Unlike cognitions of  objects and other agents, which involve causes that pertain to sensory data coming 
from outside the body, our self-cognition involves modelling endogenous causes (Seth/Suzuki/Critchley 
2012). Such self-cognition begins in infancy, when we start to apply the ‘agent-models’ generated prior, 
 That is, irrespective of repressive state apparatuses like police or military intervention; or what Searle calls “background 14
power”, i.e. the “set of presuppositions, attitudes, dispositions, capacities, and practices of any community that set 
normative constraints on the members of that community in such a way that violations of those constraints are subject to 
the negative imposition of sanctions by any member of the community” (Searle 2010, p. 160).
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and the agent-models ascribed to us, to understand the endogenous sensory input of  the body as caused 
by such-and-such an agent—on the basis of  which we then act accordingly, confirming the ascriptions 
(Hohwy/Michael 2017). Such application of  agent-models continues into adulthood. This is thus how 
interpellation is internalised and one recognises oneself  as such-and-such a subject under a given 
schema: in this feedback loop between the agent and the ascribed classification, the corollary social 
properties and schemas are more than jointly accepted of  a classification—they become one’s own 
properties and self-understanding.  15
Pertinent to false consciousness is how such a complex of  feedback loops leads to certain joint 
acceptances taking precedence over others. We need to attend to how, in cases of  structural oppression, 
certain looping mechanisms systematically function to promote specific ignorant beliefs in spite of  
counter-evidence. That is, we are concerned with how the concept can guide attention to what these 
epistemically unresponsive mechanisms are, as well as how they work to naturalise ideological experience 
of  the social world such that beliefs pertaining to these social objectifications, and not others, are 
‘guaranteed’—that is, taken for granted as (putative) knowledge in the agent’s lived experience. 
4.3. Guarantee 
Social objects are guaranteed by the stability they acquire within social structures over time. There need 
not be any general reason for why these objects naturalise over others, or why these objects and not 
others are constructed to begin with—the circumstances and content of  the constructions, just as the 
reasons for their propagation, are of  course socio-historically specific. At the same time, this feedback 
loop always occurs against a formal background system of  other loops that occur in the broader social 
world and among other subjects. Hacking (2017) observes that looping also involves more than the arcs 
between classifications and classified at the individual level, including also, at the structural level, knowledge 
involving such classifications, experts who classify, and institutions that uphold classifications: 
 
Figure 2: Looping Illustration 2 
Consider, for example, how the link between disabled people and disability classifications are understood 
to stabilise and be stabilised by how disability is understood in medical and non-medical literatures, 
medical professionals and disability activists, as well as hospitals and legislative councils (Lim 2018). 
 This is the other side of György Lukács’ observation of the phenomenon ‘reification’, wherein one’s “own activity […] 15
becomes something objective and independent of [them], something that controls [them] by virtue of an autonomy alien to 
man” (Lukács 1971, p. 87). While Michael J. Thompson insightfully notes that reification [Verdinglichung] draws on Kantian 
distinctions between Ding, Gegenstand, and Objekt as levels of being cognised, this alone nevertheless fails to account 
for how ideology also concerns the Subjekt, the cognising empirical unity of apperception [empirische Einheit der 
Apperzeption] i.e. the interpellated subject (Thompson 2017; cf. Althusser 2005, p. 230 note 7).
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Our concern here is explicitly for looping mechanisms that are epistemically unresponsive (unlike, say, 
epistemic virtues). Remaining pluralistic about the mechanisms, then, the following is a suggested, 
inexhaustive list of  such mechanisms at both individual and structural levels, noting that they need not 
all occur and that not all of  them are problematic in themselves: 
Individual: Nash equilibria, stereotype threat/boost, implicit bias, wishful thinking, confidence-
shaking, speech act accommodation, epistemic laziness, testimonial injustice, etc.  16
Structural: market equilibration, culture industry, consumer production, hermeneutical injustice, 
etc.  17
An example of  a looping mechanism functioning at the individual level to perpetuate structural 
oppression as may be found in the stereotype boost for East Asians in North America. Joint acceptance 
of  East Asians as possessing properties of  being highly competent but cold and submissive constructs 
the classification of  the ‘Asian-American’ as a model minority and interpellates relevant individuals 
(Berdahl/Min 2012). This undergirds the recognition of  the Asian-American-as-model-minority that 
manifests in practices like hiring decisions or deferring the calculation of  splitting of  the bill to them. 
With these practices, many such individuals also recognise themselves as possessing these properties due 
to the stereotype boost, contributing to their relative absence in leadership positions (Sy/Shore/Strauss/
Shore/Tram/Whiteley/Ikeda-Muromachi 2010). 
An example of  a looping mechanism functioning at the structural level is found in Haslanger’s example 
of  market equilibration in the global food industry: 
In a less-globalized world than ours, food crops were grown to support the local cuisine and 
the local tastes and culinary techniques evolved in ways that took advantage of  the crops. In 
more complex and broadly social changes we can watch consumer taste develop so that certain 
products become ‘must haves’ in a particular milieu. Trends in cuisine can become trends in 
production which, in turn, affect trends in labor, and this affects schemas of  class and taste, 
and so on. 
 […] 
 The reliance on, say, wheat in a particular cuisine may seem inevitable, natural, ‘given’. 
Wheat is what is available; wheat just is what we eat. But the wheat is available because of  the 
impact of  schemas on resources that establish farming practices, food distribution, and such. 
Given the stability of  such structures, culinary taste conforms. In this context quinoa, or soy, 
or spelt tastes bad and has a funny texture too; so who would want to plant it? (Haslanger 
2011, p. 197–198) 
This provides with a looping mechanism that stabilises, say, Orientalist attitudes towards tofu-based 
dishes as ‘a Far East exoticism’. 
Looping effects thus allow us to say that the ignorant beliefs in false consciousness both supports 
(functional ‘falsity’) and is supported by structural oppression (genetic ‘falsity’), though we avoid vacuous 
circularity since the relevant ideological schematisations of  the oppressed are constructed and 
naturalised for an agent over time. This also means that the formation of  a given false consciousness in 
the agent neither is causally prior to, nor emerges simultaneously with, the relevant oppressive relation. 
Rather, the relevant oppressive relation exists, at least initially, independently of  the interpellation and 
hence also prior to the development of  the particular false consciousness—guaranteeing it. That is, 
looping mechanisms normalise, or render ‘natural’, existing oppressive relations. This is not to say that 
such oppressive relations do not also depend on false consciousness later on, only that it is impossible to 
 See Rosen 1996, Fricker 2007, Battaly 2014, Dotson 2014, Stanley 2015, Mallon 2016, Langton 2018.16
 See Fricker 2007, Haslanger 2011, Dotson 2014, Adorno/Horkheimer 2016.17
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exhaust the reasons for why a given instance of  false consciousness is problematic without also 
attending to why the relations of  its corresponding social structure(s) is problematic.  18
4.4. Dynamics 
The dependence of  false consciousnesses on an oppressive relation means that they are domain-based: 
indexed to the range of  resources and agents schematised by the relevant social structure. A given social 
structure would delineate a stabilised complex of  loops, but a given domain may at the same time be 
schematised, partially or wholly, in other structures (oppressive or otherwise). Importantly, this mean 
that a given instance of  false consciousness is limited both in its content and mechanisms. An instance 
pertaining to suffrage, for example, would not involve beliefs about Pluto. Being domain-based means 
that false consciousness might not develop, or could erode, for at least two reasons: radical marginalisation 
and epistemic friction. 
Radical marginalisation comes from Marx’s own description of  the proletariat as the locus of  the 
possibility of  German emancipation: the violent revolt of  the fully oppressed, who have nothing to lose 
but their ‘radical chains’, against the existing structure as a whole. It is precisely the insignificance of  the 
structure for such agents who are completely marginalised that allows for the possibility of  
emancipatory consciousness. This is because the stabilising mechanisms have no force on them since 
they are not subjects under the domain of  the ideological schemas (for example, there would be no stakes 
at all for confidence-shaking): they would be able to form beliefs independent of  ideology. 
Epistemic friction comes from the fact that different social structures may schematise over the same 
resources and agents. That is, an agent likely has multiple group memberships within a given society and, 
as such, be under multiple schemas in cases of  overlapping oppression (whether purely oppressor, 
oppressed, or a mix). As Althusser notes:  
Ideologies never stop interpellating subjects as subjects, never stop ‘recruiting’ individuals who 
are always-already subjects. The play of  ideologies is superposed, criss-crossed, contradicts 
itself  on the same subject: the same individual always-already (several times) subject. (Althusser 
2014, p. 193–194). 
From this multiplicity, ideologies can either be compounded or neutralised for an agent. When they are 
compounded, schemas combine such that a given false consciousness can gain not only content but 
further stabilising mechanisms that reinforces evidence-resistance. At the same time, these overlaps can 
also condition the prevention or erosion of  false consciousness in cases where ideologies are neutralised. 
For such a multiplicity of  self-understandings may generate what José Medina calls ‘epistemic friction’, a 
discordance resulting from incompatible schemas and stabilising mechanisms running up against each 
other, which may lead to ‘meta-lucidity’. An agent would thus have “insights in to the functioning of  
perspectives that makes it possible to redraw [one’s] cognitive maps, to redescribe [one’s] experiences, 
and to reconceptualize [one’s] ways of  relating to others” (Medina 2013, p. 47). Such reconceptualisation 
would not take place in abstracto, but rather would be responsive to the various extant self-
understandings. 
In both cases of  erosion, it is by participating in alternate social constructions of  objects—and oneself  
as a subject—in non-ideological or resistant communities that one might come under social schemas 
stabilised by epistemically responsive mechanisms, and thus non-ideological or emancipatory knowledge. 
 This leaves open the question of the appropriate norms of evaluation, i.e. the normative problem: whether they are 18
external, holding it to universal standards applicable to any social structure (such as critiques employing ‘neutral’ 
conceptions of justice); internal, holding it to standards that the social structure itself schematises as its standards (such 
as critiques on the basis of unconstitutionality); or more complex modes, like immanent or reconstructive critiques (cf. 
Haslanger 2017b, Celikates 2018, Jaeggi 2019). And, importantly, in cases of false consciousness in overlapping 
oppression: (if the norms are not external) how to critique cases that involve two different schemas.
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This supports the processualists’ insight of  resistant practices, while also accounting for how agents 
might avoid false consciousness in the first place. 
However, such erosions—which may take a while—render emancipatory consciousness only possible 
and cannot guarantee actualisation. For resistant communities to be successful, alternate schemas must 
overcome the interpellation of  the old ideologies.  That is, to the extent of  diminishing the joint 19
acceptances that issue from the norm of  acknowledging that one is interpellated by a particular ideology. 
For example, no one would acknowledge being hailed as a Roman citizen in Victorian Britain. Such 
diminishment requires sustained competition and control over the schematised resources and looping 
mechanisms, and may be unsustainable in the long run without disrupting looping at the structural level, 
as well as the corollary reconfiguration of  the internal relations of  the relevant social structures. The 
massive changes to British labour markets during the Great War and the consequent shifts in public 
consciousness of  women’s role were crucial for securing suffragism’s success. It is thus perhaps 
unsurprising that false consciousness is just as commonly, if  not more often, reinforced by epistemic 
friction (Nyhan/Reifler 2010). Or erosion sometimes even results in a new type of  false consciousness 
developing in moments of  meta-lucidity as a flight from ‘meaning vertigo’ back to the interpellation of  
the old ideology (Lopes 2019). Similarly, it remains a controversial empirical question whether a revolt by 
the radically marginalised has ever been or will ever be more than a possibility. 
4.5. Summary 
I will now summarise the foregoing and how social constructionism accommodates the previous three 
approaches. The social constructionist approach to false consciousness understands the formation and 
maintenance of  ignorant beliefs to be grounded in agents taking a certain socially objectified 
understanding of  themselves as natural self-understanding, within variable complexes of  epistemically 
unresponsive looping mechanisms that are embedded in oppressive social structures over time. A given 
complex could overlap with another to form either a non-additive set of  beliefs that includes both 
ideologies, or erode either sets of  beliefs—this depends on the compatibility of  looping mechanisms 
salient for the agent in question. 
The social constructionist would explain the particular case of  ANTISUFFRAGIST as follows: 
EXPLANATIONSC: Ward has the ignorant beliefs that women are naturally deficient at political 
deliberation and that suffrage is unnecessary for addressing injustices, motivating her to 
campaign against women’s suffrage, because the contents of  those beliefs are being sustained by a complex 
of  looping mechanisms at the individual level and structural level. These mechanisms are patriarchal and 
bourgeois. 
At the individual level, this involves a loop between Ward’s self-understanding and patriarchal and bourgeois 
classifications: the classification of  ‘domestic creature’ under patriarchal ideology and the classification of  ‘subject 
who is capable of  activities that secure economic independence’ under bourgeois ideology. These then merge as 
‘women are capable of  national domestic interests’ and is sustained by mechanisms like testimonial injustice and 
epistemic arrogance. 
At the structural level, these would further involve an organisation of  loops involving: the contemporary gender 
exclusion in political institutions but gender inclusion in literary institutions; the expert opinions of  members of  
the Houses of  Parliament, literary figures, and critics; and the limited public knowledge of  the political capacity 
of  women. These are sustained by mechanisms like hermeneutical injustice and market equilibrium. 
 This leaves open how representative such new schemas and communities would be, if other oppressed agents do not 19
share the same overlaps of structural oppression (i.e. the epistemological problem), cf. Celikates 2017.
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Acquisition and Content are thus met in EXPLANATIONSC and shown to be interacting in the complex of  
looping mechanisms at both individual and structural levels. Scope is met in attending to how suffragists 
might lack similar testimonial injustice or might not have similar assurances with the ‘existing 
constitutional machinery’, thereby coming to know of  women’s capacity to perform activities that would 
but do not secure economic independence, sustained by the growing resistant community of  the social 
movement. And lastly, Systematicity is met, since Acquisition, Content, and Scope are interconnected by the 
complexes of  looping mechanisms in both gender and economic structures whose domains significantly 
overlap. And, while the general form of  this explanation may be applied to cases like Simkins’, the 
particular explanation (EXPLANATIONSC) only extends to antisuffragists in a similar social position to 
Ward. The looping mechanisms pertaining to the latter involve a different overlap of  gender and 
economic oppression to the former: the resources of  upper- and middle-class British women then, like 
charitable funds and chambermaids, are not shared by working-class women. 
Like functionalism then, social constructionism is pluralistic regarding which underlying mechanisms are 
at play in general: it could be one or a combination of  them in a particular case of  false consciousness. 
Instead of  a specific mental state that agents are in, false consciousness is to be understood as a 
conceptual tool that regulates systematic social research (without predetermining the particular 
mechanisms for every instance). What is further provided by the social constructionist framework is a 
means to identify and unify these mechanisms under a given ideology or, importantly, multiple ideologies 
(Acquisition), as well as account for their absence (Scope). 
Social constructionism also accommodates the various possible psychological mechanisms that might 
factor into particular cases of  false consciousness, without committing itself  to any one (or set) of  them 
as essential to the concept. Moreover, it provides an account for why ideal psychological conditions are 
so difficult to achieve and sustain, in supplementing the psychologistic approach with Content, Scope, and 
Systematicity. 
Finally, like processualism, social constructionism is attentive to epistemic oppression and the epistemic 
failure of  false consciousness as relational failure. It also provides an account for the possibility of  the 
success and failure of  resistant epistemic practices. At the same time, social constructionism is also able 
to address cases that are not conspiratorial in origin or that do not depend on material inequality (Scope), 
as well as the positive internalisation of  ideological self-understanding (Acquisition). 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that social constructionism is the most comprehensive answer to the explanatory problem 
of  false consciousness. It provides a general theory that meets all four explanatory desiderata of  
Acquisition, Content, Scope, and Systematicity needed for the concept in social research and emancipatory 
praxis. And, instead of  supplanting functionalism, psychologism, and processualism, it subsumes their 
explanatory strengths and supplements their weaknesses. This thus places us on firm footing to address 
the other problems of  false consciousness. 
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